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Abstract  
 
This article examines a recurrent format that speakers use for defining ordinary expressions 
or technical terms. Drawing on data from four different languages—Flemish, French, German, 
and Italian—it focuses on definitions in which a definiendum is first followed by a negative 
definitional component (‘definiendum is not X’), and then by a positive definitional component 
(‘definiendum is Y’). The analysis shows that by employing this format, speakers display 
sensitivity towards a potential meaning of the definiendum that recipients could have taken to 
be valid. By negating this meaning, speakers discard this possible, yet unintended 
understanding. The format serves three distinct interactional purposes: (a) it is used for 
argumentation, e.g. in discussions and political debates, (b) it works as a resource for 
imparting knowledge, e.g. in expert talk and instructions, and (c) it is employed, in ordinary 
conversation, for securing the addressee’s correct understanding of a possibly problematic 
expression. The findings contribute to our understanding of how epistemic claims and 
displays relate to the turn-constructional and sequential organization of talk. They also show 
that the much quoted ‘problem of meaning’ is, first and foremost, a participant’s problem. 
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1. Introduction  
In social interaction, speakers sometimes deliver definitions in order to clarify the meaning of 
an expression they use. In our previous studies of definitions in talk-in-interaction (De Stefani 
and Sambre, 2016; Deppermann, 2016), we observed that speakers often produce negative 
statements when providing a definition. Extract (1) is an example: 
 
Extract 1: FOLK_E_00210_SE_01_T_02_DF_01 Ukraine1 
die ukraIne ist kein ukraInischer staat- (0.3) 
   the Ukraine is   no   Ukrainian   state 
die ukraIne ist ein ukrainisch RUSsischer staat. 
the Ukraine is   a   Ukrainian  Russian   state 
 
Here, “Ukraine” is defined by first denying a possibly inferable meaning with a negation (ist 
kein ukrainischer staat, ‘is not a Ukranian state’). Then, the positive definition follows (die 
ukraine ist ein ukrainisch russischer staat, ‘the Ukraine is a Ukrainian Russian state’). 
In this article, we show that using such negative components in the context of a 
definition is a recipient-designed practice. Indeed, the negation excludes meaning 
components that recipients putatively, and sometimes manifestly, have taken to be a valid 
part of the definition. Hence, speakers tailor their definitions to knowledge and expectations, 
as well as to epistemic and evaluative stances, which they ascribe to their addressees. 
In the following sections, we first introduce an interactional perspective on meaning 
(section 2) and then report earlier findings about the use of definitions (section 3) and 
negation (4) in interaction. Subsequently, we describe the phenomenon under scrutiny in its 
generic structure (section 5) and present our data (6). We devote the main body of the article 
to the analysis of eight excerpts in which speakers produce definitions with a negative 
component. The analysis focus on the ways in which the negation takes into account possible 
understandings of the recipients (section 7). Finally, we will discuss our findings (section 8) 
and present the perspectives our study opens up for future research on negation and 
meaning constitution in social interaction (9). 
 
2. Approaches to linguistic meaning  
In the structuralist tradition, linguistic meaning is regarded as an effect of binary oppositions 
between linguistic signs, which result in paradigmatic sense relations (de Saussure, 1916). 
Accordingly, meaning resides in the linguistic system (langue), whereas language use 
(parole) only implements pre-established meanings. Cognitive Linguistics, in contrast, holds 
that meaning is rooted in human cognition and bodily experience (e.g. expressed through 
metaphor; Lakoff, 1987). It is marked by subjective construal and perspective (Langacker, 
1987) and rests on background knowledge, which according to Fillmore (1985) is organized in 
frames. Based on the insight that lexical items do not have meanings in isolation, the usage-
based approach has shown the ways in which syntagmatic relationships (collocations; Firth, 
1957) determine linguistic meanings (Sinclair, 1991). According to this view, the frequency of 
usage patterns leads to cognitive entrenchment, whereas social dissemination leads to 
conventionalization of meanings (Schmid, 2015). 
Usage-based approaches highlight the role of context and of actual instances of use for 
the emergence of meanings. Yet there is little interest in how interlocutors deploy and 
understand linguistic expressions in concrete occasions of use (but see Rosaldo, 1972 for an 
early ethnographic study). This question is addressed by interactional approaches to meaning 
constitution (Bilmes, 2011, 2015; Deppermann, 2007; Deppermann and Spranz-Fogasy, 
2002). These approaches show how local meanings of linguistic expressions are specified 
through turn-construction and sequential organization that ensure intersubjectivity 
(Deppermann, 2015; Sidnell, 2014). Interactional approaches to meaning study the 
                                                        
1 Transcripts follow the CA conventions established by Jefferson (2004). In the German excerpts, clitics are tied 
by “_” to their host items. 
metasemantic practices interlocutors deploy to clarify and negotiate locally relevant meanings. 
They show that contextual features located well beyond the immediate syntactic environment 
are consequential for meaning constitution, e.g. turn-constructional practices like contrasting 
(Deppermann, 2005) and generalization (Hauser, 2011), sequential accomplishments like 
repair (Schegloff et al., 1977) and formulation (Heritage and Watson, 1979),  as well 
asembodied resources such as gestures and object handling. One way in which interactants 
establish and secure the meaning of their words consists of articulating a definition. 
  
3. Definition  
Treatments of ‘definition’ date back to antiquity and may be exemplified by Aristotle’s well-
known requirement for definitions to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use 
of an expression (Aristotle, 1938). Another view, which is still influential nowadays, is the 
dictum by St. Thomas Aquinas (1947[1265]: liber I, quaestio 3, articulo 5): “definitio est ex 
genere et differentia” [‘definition is (composed) of a genus (to which the definiendum belongs) 
and (specific) differences’, trans. by the authors]. Research has shown, however, that 
definitions often do not exhibit the properties that, according to logic and philosophy, should 
hold for prototypical, i.e. stipulative, definitions. Whereas stipulative definitions establish the 
meaning of (neologistic) scientific terms, definitions of expressions that are already in use 
prove to be more difficult—if the definition is to explicate the usual meaning of the expression. 
In particular, the distinction between the expression to be defined (the definiendum) and the 
actual definition of it, stating the properties of its denotata, often proves to be impossible (cf. 
Martin’s [1990] notion of “definition naturelle”). Indeed, in the case of ostensive definition, a 
pointing gesture to an object or event, which are treated as instances of the definiendum, may 
be sufficient for a definition, even without any descriptive component. In linguistics, this close 
relationship between semantics and world-knowledge is reflected by the observation that the 
dividing line between word-meanings and encyclopedic knowledge is often at best fuzzy 
(Fillmore, 1985). Moreover, definitions can never be fully explicit, but have to rely on unstated 
background knowledge. Hence, definitions are also affected by irremediable context-
dependency, indexicality, and vagueness (Bar-Hillel, 1950; Garfinkel, 1967). A further 
problem relates to the internal semantic structure of the definienda. Rather than conforming to 
classical Ariostotelian categories—which are delimited by necessary and sufficient 
conditions—family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1950), prototype effects (Rosch, 1978), fuzzy 
boundaries, and radial structures of categories (Lakoff, 1987) are common for expressions in 
natural language. For this reason, definitions are often difficult to distinguish from descriptions 
of object/event properties or from explications of (locally) intended meanings. Recent 
empirical research on definitions in social interaction (cf. Greco and Traverso, 2016) has 
shown that speakers use definitions for different communicative purposes: imparting 
knowledge, dealing with problems of understanding, and arguing. 
In pedagogic contexts, definitions are produced as parts of longer explanations in 
which imparting knowledge is combined with the introduction of terms that are new to 
students and/or designate the objects of learning (Fasel Lauzon, 2014; Deppermann, 2016). 
Definitions can be used to solve problems of understanding, i.e. misunderstanding, 
non-understanding, or the disambiguation or specification of intended meanings 
(Deppermann, 2018). In these cases, definitions can be used in order to clarify incorrect or 
insecure understandings. A further use of definitions aims to check whether the recipient’s 
understanding of a term is correct (cf. De Stefani, 2005). 
Definitions are also used in arguments, especially in order to defend or attack an 
opinion, or a position in a (public) debate (De Stefani and Sambre, 2016; Doury and Micheli, 
2016). This use has become canonical as the topos of ‘argumentation by definition’ 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Kienpointner, 1992:250–263). In factual argument, 
interlocutors can infer from a definition that something is true (or not). In pragmatic argument, 
a definition lets recipients infer that something has to be done (or avoided), e.g. a specific 
(political) action has to be taken. Argumentative uses are, therefore, often normative, 
precisely because, by using them, speakers insist on the practical relevance of the definition 
for choosing the ‘right’ opinion or action. 
In sum, studies of definitions in interactional (and also textual) contexts show that 
definitions are designed for practical purposes, related both to participants’ larger joint 
projects and also to the defining speaker’s personal goals. 
 
4. Negation in interaction 
Negation has mainly been studied in terms of grammatical realization and semantic properties, 
such as scope and truth-conditional properties. In this respect, morphological negation (e.g. 
by prefixes, such as un-, de-, dis-) has to be distinguished from lexical negation by negative 
items, such as negative particles (not), prepositions (without), and determiners (no). Only 
lexical negation has scope over other syntactic constituents. Pragmatic studies of negation 
focus on the relationship between lexical negation and presupposition and implicature (Horn, 
2001: ch.4) and on the level on which negation operates (e.g. Roitman 2017). Negation can 
concern the epistemic (propositional), the descriptive or the metalinguistic level (Horn, 2001: 
ch.5; Blühdorn, 2012: ch.10–12). Verhagen (2005: ch.2) claims that negation presupposes 
that the negated alternative is contextually relevant. According to him, sentential negation 
invites the recipient “to consider-and-abandon […] a positive epistemic stance to […] 
conclusions from the previous discourse” (Verhagen, 2005:72). The few existing studies of 
the use of negation in social interaction support this view. Speakers can use negation in 
relation to their own talk to “retract overstatements” (Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson, 2005), or 
to constrain the interpretation of what is said by denying possible, unwanted inferences, which 
recipients might draw from the speaker’s talk (Deppermann, 2014). Negations of the 
recipient’s prior talk occur in the context of negative responses to polar interrogatives, 
disagreements (Ford, 2001, 2002; cf. also Heinemann, 1983:107–132), and third-turn repairs, 
which correct the interlocutor’s misunderstanding of the speaker’s own prior talk (Schegloff, 
1992). Deppermann (2014) therefore claims that negation is recipient-designed: it is used to 
exclude assumptions from common ground (Clark, 1992, 1996), which the interlocutor 
possibly or manifestly takes to be true. In our study, we focus on the role of negation in the 
context of definitions. To our knowledge, this use of negation has not yet been studied. 
 
5. The phenomenon 
This article analyzes negations in the context of definitions occurring in various settings of 
interaction carried out in Flemish, French, German, and Italian. We focus on definitions 
exhibiting the following order of components: the speaker first uses an expression and then 
produces a Negative Definitional Component (henceforth: NDC), which lets recipients 
retrospectively identify the related lexical item as the Definiendum (henceforth: D). In a third 
step, the speaker adds a Positive Definitional Component (henceforth: PDC). 
 
The canonical structure of the cases of definitions we consider is thus: 
 
DExpressionD Nis not XN, but Pis YP 
 
 NDC and PDC have an antithetic relationship (Mann and Thompson, 1987), i.e. the truth of X 
is denied and supplanted by Y. In German, the antithetic relation is mostly encoded by the 
connective sondern, which prefaces PDC, whereas French mais and Italian ma/però are used 
to express antithesis. In the transcripts below, the three parts of the definition are labeled by 
the indices D (definiendum), N (NDC) and P (PDC) at the beginning and end of each 
component, e.g.: 
 
Extract 2: FOLK_E_00210_SE_01_T_02_DF_01 Ukraine (with indices) 
Ddie ukraIneD Nist kein ukraInischer staat-N (0.3) 
   the  Ukraine   is  no   Ukrainian   state 
die ukraIne Pist ein ukrainisch RUSsischer staat.P  
the Ukraine  is   a  Ukrainian   Russian   state 
 
Except for one case (ex. 5), the instances we discuss are all same-speaker initiated, i.e. the 
definiendum as well as the NDC and PDC are produced by the same speaker within one turn. 
We consider the NDC to be an integral part of the definition, rather than ‘just’ an exclusion of 
unintended inferences, for three reasons: a) speakers produce the negation immediately after 
the definiendum and before the PDC, b) they do not produce NDCs as a parenthesis, and c) 
the NDC does not end in a transition relevance place (Sacks et al., 1974), but projects turn-
continuation through an affirmative statement. 
 
6. Data and method 
Our study rests on transcribed audio and video corpora of talk-in-interaction. The German 
data come from the publicly accessible database FOLK (Forschungs- und Lehrkorpus 
gesprochenes Deutsch, dgd.ids-mannheim.de; Schmidt, 2016). The French data stem from 
dinner table interactions collected in Switzerland as part of the corpus CIEL-F (Corpus 
International Écologique de la Langue Française, www.ciel-f.org), which documents talk-in-
interaction in francophone areas throughout the world. For the Italian data we consider two 
sources, namely dinner table interactions collected in Italy for the corpus ALIAS (Archivio di 
LInguA Spontanea, www.arts.kuleuven.be/ling/alias/) and TV debates on same-sex marriage 
aired in Italy in 2016. Finally, we analyze a Flemish excerpt taken from a meeting of a mutual-
help group for people affected by Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (De Stefani and Sambre, 2016). 
As stated in section 5, our sample consists of instances of lexical negation exhibiting 
the order ‘definiendum – NDC – PDC’. In total, we analyzed 27 instances in depth, among 
which were 16 from German, seven from Italian, three from French and one from Flemish. 
After having noticed in a prior study (Deppermann, 2016) that negative components are 
sometimes used in definitions, we decided to systematically search for them in the corpora. 
Since definitions cannot be retrieved automatically, we looked for occurrences of negative 
particles (niet, nicht, (ne) pas, non) and negative articles (e.g. geen, kein/e, aucun/e, 
nessun/a). About five percent of the negations we inspected (800 occurrences) were judged 
to be instances of negative definitional components. We decided to focus on the most 
frequent format [DExpressionD Nis not XN, but Pis YP] found in those occurrences. Other 
formats encountered in the data were excluded from the sample (e.g. [DExpressionD Nis not 
XN, because it Pis YP], [DExpressionD Pis YP; it Nis not XN], [DExpressionD Pis a YP Nwithout XN], 
etc.). 
As regards the languages considered in this article, we did not find language-specific 
corollaries. Therefore, we do not structure our analysis according to the different languages, 
but according to the contexts of use of NDCs which we found in our data. We do not claim 
that the format we identified is universal, but that it is an available resource for speakers of 
the languages considered in this article. In order to better illustrate the phenomenon, we use 
data from a wide range of interaction types,  including social interaction from various private, 
public, and institutional settings, such as talk among friends, broadcast debates, interviews, 
discussions in a mutual-help group, university vivas, and driving lessons. 
The aim of this article is to carve out the recipient-designed dimension of the definitions 
under scrutiny. Although we will also focus on particular sequential uses and formats of 
definitions including an NDC, our primary aim is to discover the ways in which the NDC of a 
definition relates to putatively ascribed recipients’ knowledge and epistemic or evaluative 
stances, and we use Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics to do so. 
 
7. Analysis 
Providing an NDC is a recipient-designed practice. It builds on knowledge, expectations, and 
epistemic positions concerning the meaning of the definiendum that the speaker producing 
the definition attributes to their addressee. Negating the validity of such meanings is a way of 
anchoring the definition in the interlocutor’s assumptions. There are several sources for a 
speaker’s assumptions about the addressee’s possible unintended understandings, which the 
speaker aims to inhibit through negation: 
 The source of the NDC may be located in the same speaker’s preceding talk (section 
7.1); 
 the source of the NDC may be located in the addressee’s preceding talk (7.2); 
 the negated meaning can be attributed to third parties (7.3), who may be present or 
absent, explicitly referred to or left anonymous, explicitly quoted or only alluded to; 
 the source of the NDC is not verbalized, but is contextually salient (7.4). 
If the source of the NDC has been produced in previous talk, it is noted by the index S in the 
transcript. 
 
7.1 NDCs drawing on speaker’s preceding talk 
The NDC can be motivated by a subject matter that is topically related to the definiendum and 
which has been talked about before. The NDC then serves to contrast the definiendum with 
preceding statements or with previously used expressions bearing some semantic similarity to 
the definiendum. Extract 3 is from an expert interview. The interviewee (ITE) talks about his 
experience and knowledge as a member of the rockabilly and psychobilly scenes. After 
having described the dancing style practiced at rockabilly concerts, jive (01–07), he contrasts 
it with the dancing style associated with psychobilly, named going mental (20).2 
 
Extract 3: FOLK_E_00191_SE_01_T_02_DF_01_c79-94 going mental 
                                                        
2 Although we understand that extract 3 may be a bit hard to understand for readers who are not familiar with the 
different dance styles, we chose not to give a dictionary meaning (or another explanation) of these notions. 
Indeed, the novice reader is in about the same position as the interviewer in the excerpt, whose understanding 
also has to rely on the semantic work carried out by the interviewee. Therefore, starting from an unknowing 
position as a reader might even be helpful for getting a clearer idea of what the interviewer’s definitional work 
achieves and what it does not. 
01 ITE ich meine auf konzerten bei beim rockabilly is es (.) maximal 
       I mean at concerts with with rockabilly it is at most 
02     dass du anfängst äh rä- Srockabilly jive zu tanzen,S= 
       that you start to dance rockabilly jive 
03     =also °h wie du_s aus filmen kennst? 
        so as you know it from movies 
04     (.) ja?= 
           yes 
05      =so (.) auf highschool[abschluss. ] 
         like at the prom 
06 ITR                        [Sso_n  rich]tiger ji[ve;S] 
                               kind of a real jive 
07 ITE                                            [ Sn_]richtiger (.) jive.S 
                                                    a real jive 
08 ITE mit (.) allem drehn drüber und hier un (.) ko[mplett oben rum,           ] 
       with    all turning over and here completely up around 
09 ITR                                              [könnt ich mein vater hinsch]icken. 
                                                     I could send my father there 
10 ITR der war tanzlehre[r.   ] 
       he was a dancing teacher 
11 ITE                  [.hh j]a? (0.4) 
                             yes    
12 ITE ah des de[s (.) der wird sich freun.] 
       PTCL this this  he will be glad 
13 ITR          [mh:::?                    ] 
14 ITE (.) der wird sich freun.   
           he will be glad 
15     .h un beim psychobilly is es so dass in der ersten reihe, 
          and with psychobilly it is so that in the first row 
16     man nannte, 
       it was called 
17     es gibt auch ne: mh: auch da ne dokumentation die auf arte lief,= 
       there is also a PTCL also there a documentation which was on Arte3 
18     =über den psychobilly un dann auch (.) direkt über pi paul fenech, 
        about the psychobilly and then also directly about P Paul Fenech 
19     .h (.) der erfinder des psychobillys. 
              the inventor of psychobilly 
20     =ä:hm .h (0.3) ((schmatzt)) des Dgoing mental.D 
        erm           ((lip smack)) of going mental 
21     (.) Nkein mittanzen mehr mit jive,N= 
           no more joining in the dance with jive 
22     =sondern so_n (.) ja Nnicht POgen.N 
        but kinda        well not mashing/pogo 
23     das ka_man nich sagen;= 
       one can’t say this 
24     =Pdas is eher so_n mitkämpfen in der ersten reiheP wird es tituliert.= 
        it is rather kinda joining the fight in the first row it is called 
25 ITR =so_n .h (.) also schon auch härter im tan[z.] 
        kind of     so   PTCL PTCL harder in terms of dancing 
26 ITE                                           [ a]bsolut? 
                                                   absolutely 
27 ITE  (.) also das is äh: (.) man is blau un grün we_ma mitmacht. (0.3) 
           so this is  erm      one gets blue and green if you participate 
The interviewee characterizes going mental (20), which is associated with psychobilly (15–20), 
with a double negative contrast: kein mittanzen mehr mit jive, (‘no more joining in the dance 
with jive’, 21) and nicht pogen; (‘not mashing/pogo’, 22). Fig. 1 schematically represents the 
local taxonomy that the interviewer constructs here. 
 
                                                        
3 Arte is the name of a Franco-German tv channel with a focus on culture and fine arts. 
Musical style rockabilly psychobilly [punk]4 
Associated dancing style jive going mental pogen 
Figure 1. Emergent local taxonomy in extract 3 
 
Jive was discussed earlier at some length (01–07). The interviewer indexed her familiarity 
with this dance style (06), adding that her father was a dance teacher (09–10). When the 
interviewee turns to going mental, which he presents as the dance style of psychobilly, the 
interviewer does not show any uptake. The interviewee now uses the common ground which 
has been established before concerning jive to give a definition of going mental through a 
negative contrast with jive. He goes on to project a positive antithetic contrast (sondern so_n, 
‘but kinda’, 22), which, however, is abandoned in favor of another negative contrast kein 
pogen (‘no pogo/mashing’, 22): while pogen was not mentioned before, it can be taken to be 
a more widely known term than going mental.5 The interviewee indexes that pogen is not 
incorrect, but that it comes close to the meaning of going mental while still not equaling it 
sufficiently. After explicitly expressing its inadequacy for defining going mental (23), he 
provides a tentative PDC: das is eher so_n mitkämpfen in der ersten reihe, ‘it is rather kinda 
joining the fight in the first row’ (24). This PDC is hedged by indexing its vague and 
approximative status (eher so_n, ‘rather kinda’) and by a metalinguistic comment (wird es 
tituliert, ‘it is called’, 24). The interviewer checks her understanding of the interviewee’s 
definitional work by proposing a comparison (härter im tanz, ‘harder in terms of dancing’, 25), 
which again takes the other dance styles as points of reference for defining the meaning of 
going mental.6 The interviewee confirms this without reserve and adds an account of 
experiences of being hurt as a consequence of participating in going mental (27 and 
subsequent lines). 
The NDCs serve to define going mental by contrasting it with other dancing styles, 
which are salient as an antecedent (jive) or are taken to share common ground without having 
been mentioned before (pogen). The definitional activity creates paradigmatic, taxonomic 
relationships of associations between musical and dancing styles (see Fig. 1; cf. Bilmes, 
2011; Hauser, 2011). While the taxonomic superordinate category (music-genre associated 
dance styles) accounts for the genus proximum, the paradigmatic contrast with negative 
alternatives allows the interviewee to delimit the definiendum and root it in shared knowledge. 
However, the NDCs are not sufficient to define going mental. They project additional, positive 
descriptive work that (at least approximatively) completes the definition. 
The definitional work in extract 3 is part of a complex expert account, which allows a 
speaker with higher epistemic status to impart knowledge to a participant with less knowledge. 
The definition starts with the NDCs as contrasts, then provides a PDC by way of antithesis 
and is extended by an account that no longer defines going mental, but states some of the 
prototypical properties associated with its denotatum (experiences, consequences). Hence, 
the established relationships between music categories and their respective dance styles 
show that the latter are “category-bound activities” (Sacks, 1972). 
 
                                                        
4 Not mentioned in the excerpt. 
5 Thus, nicht pogen is an instance of a negative definitional component which is contextually salient, because it 
is assumed to be known to all participants (see section 7.4). 
6 However, it is not clear whether the comparison only relates to jive or also to pogen. 
7.2 NDCs rejecting assumptions from addressee’s prior talk 
The choice of an NDC can be motivated by the prior talk of the addressee, from which the 
speaker infers that the addressee takes some meaning to be part of the definition of the 
definiendum, which, however, according to the speaker’s view, is faulty. In our data, this 
occurs in pedagogically motivated examinations as well as in argumentative talk. Extract 4 is 
an example, taken from a university viva in German literature studies. The examiner (EXA) 
asks the student (STU) to give an example of a ‘production-oriented procedure’ in literary 
instruction at school (01–03). The student first explains the goals of production orientation 
(05–09) and then gives three examples (10–13). 
 
Extract 4: FOLK0033_c492-510 produktionsorientiertes verfahren 
01 EXA .h können sie ein beispiel nennen für ein produktionsorientiertes verfahren?= 
       can you name an example for a production-oriented procedure 
02     =mit dessen hIlfe die schüler textstrukturen oder textelemente erkennen sollen?= 
       with the help of which pupils should identify text-structures or text-elements 
03     =man sagt doch im allgemeinen produktionsorientierung is gut für die interpretation. 
       they say PTCL in general that production-orientation fosters interpretation 
04 STU hm_hm, (.) 
       uhum 
05     äh man kann (0.4) zum beispiel öh bei nem bei nem produktionsorientierten verfahren.= 
       erm one can      for example erm with a with a production-oriented procedure 
06     =wie_s der name schon sagt.= 
        as the name already says 
07     =Ss kommt immer n produkt bei raus.S=ne? 
        it results always in a product right 
08     ((lacht)) also man ge 
       ((laughs)) so one  
09     das is (.) immer so zu sehen dass schüler wirklich selber texte och schreiben. 
       it is always to see in a way that pupils really write texts themselves 
10     =das heißt entweder nen nen alternatives ende .h verfassen. 
        which means either write an an alternative end 
11     =oder briefe an (.) gewisse figuren.=.hh ah:::  (0.3) 
        or letters to certain figures erm 
12 EXA ((schnalzt)) ja? 
       ((click of the tongue)) yes 
13 STU oder oder (.) [oder tage]buch[einträge oder so was,] 
       or or diary entries or something like that 
14 EXA               [ja–      ] 
                      yes 
15 EXA                              [ja  is aber dann  kon]kreter die frage. (0.5) 
                                     well but is then more concretely the question 
16 EXA die definition war übrigens nich ganz korrekt,=es öh  
       by the way the definition was not quite correct it erm 
17     Dproduktionsorientiertes verfahrenD Nheißt es NICH  
       it is not called production-oriented procedure  
18     weil unbedingt ein produkt rauskommt.N= 
       because it necessarily results in a product 
19     =öh sondern Pweil die schüler °h quasi literarisch schreiben?P 
        erm but because the pupils write quasi literarily 
20 STU [hm_hm.] 
        uhum 
21 EXA [°hh   ]aber die frage ist.= 
               but the question is  
22     =können sie ein beispiel nennen für eine aufgabe, 
        can you tell me an example for a task 
 
The examiner explicitly refers to the student’s prior turn as a definition (16) of 
produktionsorientiertes verfahren, which she assesses as not quite correct. She corrects it by 
first negating the validity of the student’s prior claim: heißt es NICH weil unbedingt ein produkt 
rauskommt (‘it is not called production-oriented procedure because it necessarily results in a 
product’, 17–18). The antecedent was the student’s explanation: wie_s der NAme schon sagt. 
=s kommt immer n produkt bei raus (‘as the name already says, it always results in a product’, 
06–07).7 The antithetic replacement of the negated definitional component amounts to a 
specification of what the student had termed produkt: the examiner affirms that pupils write in 
a quasi-literary fashion (19). This correction can be seen as reproaching the student because 
her definition lacks the necessary semantic precision and specificity. The student 
acknowledges the corrective definition with a response token (20). 
The definition as a whole is inserted as a parenthesis (16–19) into another action, 
asking the student for examples of the definiendum (15–22). The definition serves to correct 
the student’s theoretical understanding of the concept, which can be seen as a prerequisite 
for a correct answer. Hence, the definition addresses a misunderstanding that the examiner 
has discovered in the student’s prior talk. It amounts to an authoritative corrective instruction 
by a participant with higher epistemic status. This non-projected other-correction is warranted 
by the task structure of university vivas, in which testing students’ knowledge of technical 
terms relating to the subject they are studying is one of the main concerns of the examination. 
Therefore, public attention to the semantic precision of students’ use of terminology in 
accordance with commonly accepted definitions is a legitimate routine of viva examiners. 
In the following excerpt, taken from a dinner table conversation among four friends, 
what ends up as a definition also builds on assumptions that can be drawn from previous talk. 
The participants have just discussed their smoking habits and how difficult it is to quit smoking. 
Xavier (XAV), who is a non-smoker, comes in with an utterance presenting himself as a heavy 
drinker (j’bois (.) à outrance, ‘I drink in excess’, 01), and subsequently explains that he usually 
has a beer when coming home from work (05–08). 
 
Extract 5: Lausanne Souper B 88:51–89:32 alcoolisme 
01 XAV moi Sj’bois (.) à outran[ceS c’est génial       ] 
       I  drink     in excess   it’s great 
02 GRE                         [non mais moi j’te vois] plus boire du vin. 
                                no but I see you more drinking wine 
03     (0.3) 
04 XAV oui mais ça dépend dans quel (cas;cadre), 
       yes but it depends on which (case;context) 
05     si j’rentre du boulot à six heures et que:lques et puis 
       if I get home from work at six something and then 
06     qu’y a une bière fraîche au fri[go,] 
       there is a fresh beer in the fridge 
07 GRE                                [ah:] ouais 
                                       oh yeah 
08 XAV surtout à la belle saison y a: j’ai aucun problème avec ça (donc). 
       especially in the summer months there is I have no prolem with this PTCL 
09 GRE ah ouais [c’est marrant moi j’te voyais a]ssez vin. 
       oh yeah it’s funny I saw you rather (drinking) wine 
10 MAR          [°non mais bien sûr°            ] 
                  no but of course 
                                                        
7 The student’s statement in 07–08 could also be understood as a pun (which may be indexed by the student’s 
laughter in 08), and not necessarily as an attempt to give a full-fledged definition, as it is instead treated by the 
examiner in line 17. The examiner’s correction thus epitomizes the risk students run when introducing an 
element of humor in an unsafeguarded manner, because in the context of a university viva every statement can 
legitimately be treated as an expression of assessable scholarly competence. 
11     (1.4) 
12 MAR non mais Nboire une bière c’est pas d’l’DalcoolismeDN hein? 
       no but drinking one beer that’s not alcoholism huh 
13     (0.2) 
14 GRE non mais [bon     ] 
       no but well 
15 XAV          [non mais] Pd’en boire deux puis après encore du vin pendant le repas,P 
                 no but    drinking two of them and then some wine during dinner 
16 MAR ((chuckles)) .h:  
17 GRE Pça [tous les jou:rs ]P 
       that every day 
18 MAR    P[et puis un litre] de digestif tous les jours.P 
            and then a liter of digestive every day 
19 XAV ((chuckles)) 
20     (2.0) 
21 GRE ((click)) e:t oui.  
                 well yes 
22     (1.7)  
23 GRE ((click)) (.) oui: en même temps euh::: 
                     yes at the same time uh 
24     (1.2)  
25 GRE si tu prends les critè:res euh médicaux on est tous alcooliques hein? 
       if you take the medical uh criteria we are all alcoholics huh 
26     (1.4) 
27 MAR b- (.) ben:: c’est deux verres par jour. 
              well that’s two glasses a day 
28     (0.3) 
29 GRE °°ouais°° 
         yeah 
30     (0.9) 
31 MAR donc moi j’suis pas alcoolique par exemple. 
       so I’m not an alcoholic for example 
 
Xavier presents himself as someone who drinks ‘in excess’ (01), thereby becoming potentially 
categorizable as a ‘heavy drinker’. The evidence he provides for this claim is that he is used 
to ‘drinking one beer after work’ (05–08). On the basis of this, Marc (MAR) rejects Xavier’s 
self-ascribed category of ‘heavy drinker’. He does so by means of a definition. Differently from 
what we have seen in the previous excerpts, Marc’s definition starts with the definiens (boire 
une bière, ‘drinking one beer’), whereas the definiendum (alcoolisme, ‘alcoholism’) is 
produced only at the end of his turn (12). Thus, the NDC contains the first mention of the 
definiendum, which has been, at least conceptually, present in prior talk (01). In this way, 
Marc establishes the term as ‘debatable’. Indeed, subsequently two participants, Grégory 
(GRE) (14) and Xavier (15), initiate turns that display minimal agreement with Marc’s negative 
statement (non, ‘no’) followed by the disagreement token mais (‘but’). Xavier succeeds in 
taking the turn and utters a PDC that he relates to ‘alcoholism’, namely ‘drinking two of them 
and then some wine during dinner’ (15), which is extended both by Grégory (ça tous les jou:rs, 
‘that every day’, 17) and by Marc, who adds ‘and then a liter of digestive every day’ (18). The 
PDC relies on analepsis and on an extensional understanding of what ‘alcoholism’ is, based 
on the consumption self- and other-attributed to Xavier. This is done in a humorous and 
exaggerated manner, as Marc’s and Xavier’s chuckling (16, 19) shows. In this case, talk 
about ‘alcoholism’ emerges incidentally, during an ordinary dinner table discussion, which has 
no pre-established topical agenda. This is visible in the way participants treat upcoming 
definitional problems—which they solve chorally and with displays of laughter. Although the 
definition participates in the argumentation, it is neither normative nor stipulative. Rather, 
participants negotiate self- and other-categorizations through chorally defining what 
‘alcoholism’ is. Even when an epistemic authority is invoked (‘medical criteria’, 25), according 
to which ‘two glasses a day’ (27) is the criterion that reportedly qualifies a person as an 
alcoholic, this is treated as relevant for membership categorization—as can be seen in Marc’s 
response to the reported medical definition (‘so I’m not an alcoholic’, 31)—rather than as a 
contribution to the true meaning of ‘alcoholism’. 
 
7.3 NDCs attributed to misconceptions of third parties 
The NDC can be motivated by reference to third parties’ understanding of the expression in 
question. This understanding may be widespread and therefore taken to be general 
knowledge, at least in a certain community (cf. Clark, 1996). Because of this, it may not be 
necessary to explicitly ascribe it to a specific group of people. This is visible in the following 
excerpt, taken from a discussion among members of a mutual-help group for persons affected 
by Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS; see De Stefani and Sambre, 2016; De Stefani, 
forthcoming). Karel (KAR) is arguing that according to him CFS is not a ‘syndrome’, but that it 
is actually Lyme disease combined with other co-infections. 
 
Extract 6: CFS 2165_2 06:54–07:27 cvs 
01 KAR (...) stilaan beginnen der meer en meer en zeker bij die jonge  
             slowly more and more begin  and certainly among the young 
02     artsen beginnen meer en meer in te zien .h dat DcvsD Ndat we dat 
       doctors more and more begin understanding .h that CFS that we 
03     niet moeten benaderen .h als een euh syndroom of ‘k weet niet  
       do not have to approach it .h as a uh syndrome or I don’t know 
04     wat waar we niet kunnen aan beginnen,N  
       what where we can’t do anything about  
05 KAR .h nee Phet is <LYME.>P 
       .h no it is lyme (disease) 
06     (1.3)  
07 KAR alstublieft,  
       please 
08     (0.4)  
09 KAR Pplus euh: plus co-infecties.P 
       plus uh  plus co-infections 
10     (0.8) 
11 KAR hé dus de bartonella en (  ) zijn er ook nog een paar bij  
       huh so the bartonella and (  ) there are also a couple of 
12     (awel) (.) als ge al in de groep allemaal samentelt dan  
       (well)     if you just count everyone in the group then 
13     [komde misschien aan achtennegentig procent [(   )- 
        you reach perhaps ninety-eight percent      (   )- 
14 BER [°ja°                                       [mag ik vragen,  
         yes                                         may I ask 
15     hebde gij medische studies gedaan?  
       have you done medical studies 
16 KAR ik heb geen medische [studies ge[daan (.) maar ik ben& 
        I haven’t done any medical studies    but I am 
17 BER                      [°ja°       [okay 
                              yes        okay 
18 KAR &nu- ja waarom zegt ge da?  
        now- yes why are you saying that 
19     (0.5) 
20 BER euh omdat het voor mij is dat heel belangrijk. 
       uh because it is for me it is very important 
 
Karel introduces his claim by presenting it as an insight that an increasing number of ‘young 
doctors’ (01–02) are gaining. His claim is endorsed by experts of medical science, who “own” 
(Sharrock, 1974; see also Foucault, 1997) medical knowledge and therefore are invoked as 
epistemic authorities (De Stefani, forthcoming). The fact that he mentions ‘young’ practitioners 
might allow listeners to infer that they are expected to have a more updated understanding of 
CFS, based on recent research, which might possibly explain their reported differing views 
contrasting with more traditional accounts of the disease. Karel then introduces the object of 
his argument, CFS (02), and immediately adds what CFS is not: a ‘syndrome (…) where we 
can’t do anything about (it)’ (03–04). Karel hence negates a possible understanding of CFS—
which is widely known in this community, namely that CFS is a syndrome, i.e. a cluster of 
symptoms with unexplained etiology. His utterance is pragmatically incomplete at this point: 
by invalidating a specific understanding, Karel projects that he is going to deliver an opposing 
understanding. Indeed, he uses continuative intonation on beginnen, (04). What follows is a 
further expression of negation, which Karel prosodically emphasizes (nee, ‘no’, 05), and then 
a PDC: het is <LYME.> (‘it is lyme (disease)’, 05). The definiendum is produced as the 
pronoun het (‘it’), which anaphorically refers to the previously mentioned ‘CFS’. The copula is 
links the definiendum to the subsequent definiens, which at this point is produced with a 
slower pace and louder voice, as <LYME.> (05). The definitional nature of this action 
emerges from its syntactic and prosodic patterning, as well as from a shift in perspective that 
Karel accomplishes. Whereas the NDC represents a we-perspective (‘we don’t have to 
approach it’, 02–03), the PDC is impersonal (‘it is’, 05), thereby displaying the normative 
dimension of Karel’s claim. 
The end of Karel’s definition (05) opens up a transition-relevance place (TRP): his turn 
is indeed syntactically, prosodically, and pragmatically complete and Karel could expect some 
form of uptake—e.g. a display of (dis-)agreement—from some of the about 30 co-present 
individuals. But nobody self-selects and a pause occurs (06). Karel thus extends his turn and 
in doing so sensibly modifies the definiens, which is now presented as Lyme disease ‘plus co-
infections’ (09). In other words, Karel’s modification of the definiens allows him to deal with 
the lack of response from his co-participants. The semantic content of the definiens itself 
emerges from the practical problems Karel faces here in mobilizing a response. 
His extension occasions a new TRP, but again no one self-selects and a further pause 
occurs (10). This time, Karel extends his turn by providing an example of the ‘co-infections’ he 
has just mentioned, i.e. the name of a specific bacterium, bartonella (11). While 
exemplifications are not part of definitions per se, they are typically produced in the service of 
definitions (e.g. in dictionaries); see Bilmes (2015: ch.3–4). Karel then backs up his claim by 
suggesting that 98% of the co-present participants would test positive for Lyme disease (12–
13), although they have officially been diagnosed with CFS. It is only at this point that Bert 
(BER) responds to Karel’s arguments, asking him whether he has ‘done medical studies’ (15). 
By asking this question, Bert calls into question Karel’s epistemic authority in medical matters. 
Indeed, Karel denies having a medical background (16), thereby dismissing his right to 
articulate definitions of what CFS ‘is’. By doing so, Bert reifies the idea according to which 
only specific members (i.e. medical experts) “own” (Sharrock, 1974) technical knowledge. 
Based on this, ‘non-specialists’ can be denied the right to display such knowledge, even if 
they use technical terms (such as bartonella; Gülich, 2003). 
 Political debates provide a further setting in which expressions are defined for 
argumentative purposes. This is visible in the following excerpt, taken from an Italian televised 
debate about same-sex marriage. It was broadcast in January 2016 (as part of a show called 
Omnibus on the Italian TV-channel La7), a few days after the so-called ‘Family Day’ (a 
demonstration promoting the idea that legal recognition of a family should only be possible 
among people of different sex) had taken place in Rome. The philosopher Umberto Galimberti 
(GAL) is intervening in the discussion from a remote studio, supporting same-sex marriage: 
 
Extract 7 Omnibus 31/01/2016 11:22-12:36 figli  
01 GAL ((...)) e i bambini hanno bisogno di amore non necessiaramente .h di 
               and children are in need of love not necessarily .h of 
02     differenze sessuali che la smettano di dire che la famiglia è fatta di un 
       sexual differences let’s stop saying that the family is made of a 
03     uomo e d’una donna. 
       man and a woman 
04     .h perché questa è una visione fondamentalmente materialista,= 
       .h because this is a fundamentally materialist vision 
05 ??? =((chuck[les)) 
06 GAL         [difesa dai cattolici che parlano sempre di spirito, 
                defended by the catholics who always speak of the spirit 
07     .h perché se il criterio dell- dello star insieme è semplicemente 
       .h because if the criterion of- of being together is simply 
08     quello di metter al mondo i figli, 
       the one to put children in the world 
09     .h allora è il materialismo più bieco questo. 
       .h then this is the most miserable materialism 
10     [.h 
11 ??? [.h 
12 GAL mentre: eh lo star insieme ha anche il significato  
       whereas uh being together has also the meaning 
13     .h d(h)i vo(h)lersi bene: di: dedicarsi (.) a un’opera educativa,  
       .h of caring for each other of devoting onself to an educational work 
14     .h perché Di figliD Nsono figli non perché (0.5) vai a letto con una donna e 
       .h because the children are children not because you go to bed with a woman and 
15     una donna va a letto con un uomo.N 
       a woman goes to bed with a man 
16     Psono figli perché li cresci. 
       they are children because you raise them 
17     (0.3) 
18 GAL .h perché gli stai insieme perché rispondi alle loro domande. 
       .h because you stay together because you answer their questions 
19     .h perché stai attento ai loro bisogni.P 
       .h because you take care of their needs 
20     questo significa paternità e maternità. 
       this means paternity and maternity 
21     .h da chiunque sia svolta. 
       .h by whomsoever it is carried out 
 
Galimberti produces the definition after having presented his arguments for about two minutes. 
The definition starts with figli—which in this context translates as ‘children’—and which will be 
treated as a definiendum. Galimberti explains why ‘children are children’ (14): he first negates 
a possible ‘procreational’ understanding of the concept, namely that children are such 
because a man and a woman go to bed together (14–15), which he seems to attribute to ‘the 
Catholics’ (06). Immediately after this, he produces the PDC: ‘children’ are individuals you 
‘raise’ (16), with whom you ‘stay together’ (18), whose questions you answer (18), and whose 
needs you take care of (19). Galimberti rhetorically highlights the opposition between NDC 
and the PDCs by using the same syntactic resource (cf. Atkinson, 1984:73–82), namely the 
copula sono, ‘they are’, followed by the conjunction perché, ‘because’ (sono figli non perché, 
‘they are children not because’, 14, versus sono figli perché, ‘they are children because’, 16). 
Although Galimberti is suggesting a specific understanding of figli, ‘children’, he is not 
invalidating the idea that children can be the outcome of sexual reproduction. Rather, the 
speaker here hierarchically orders the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to identify 
someone as a ‘child’. By defining the essential traits of a child on the basis of the personal 
relationship with the parents, Galimberti treats direct, biological descent as optional. This 
definition is thus in the service of his argumentation in favor of same-sex marriage, including 
the right to adopt children. This is also visible in the conclusion of his statement, where he 
reframes his definition of what ‘children’ are as implying the definition of ‘paternity and 
maternity by whomsoever it is carried out’ (20–21). 
In both excerpts analyzed in this section definitions are employed for argumentative 
purposes—a use that the literature has observed (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958] 
1983:282–288), but only rarely described on the basis of empirical data (but see Micheli, 
2010; Doury and Micheli, 2016). Defining in these contexts is a way of publicly taking sides 
and taking a position. Moreover, by defining, participants ‘appropriate’ (Liedtke et al., 1991) 
an expression for their argumentative purposes at hand. In such settings, defining thus 
acquires a political dimension. 
Extract 8 is taken from a driving lesson. The instructor (INS) explains the car controls 
to the student (STU), who is sitting in the driver’s seat for the first time. The instructor 
describes the use of the switch activating the car’s headlights. 
 
Extract 8: FAHR_02_A05_31.16-31.40 Abblendlicht8 
01 INS eine stufe wei:ter, 
       one step further  
02     (0.2)+(0.3)+ 
   stu      +turns switch+             
03 INS is dann des Dab (.) blend (.) lischt.D 
       then is the low beam light 
04 STU ʔhmhm.  
        uhum 
05 INS (hör isch immer) viele sagen immer <abendlicht.> 
       (I always hear) many always say evening light 
06 STU ((laughs)) 
07 INS Ndes hat aber mit abend nix zu tunN 
        this hasn’t got anything to do with evening 
08     sondern des heißt ab (.) blend (.) licht, (.) 
       but it’s called low beam light 
09     ja?=und Pdes is des licht was de anmachen musst 
       right? and this is the light you have to turn on 
10     im dunkeln tunnel regen schneefall::: (.) dämmerung, (0.5) 
       in the dark tunnel rain snowfall dusk 
11     und so weiter und so fort,P 
       and so on and so forth 
12     °h also immer dran denken, 
          so always think.INF of it 
13 INS wenn du an dem (.) dings da drehst an dem schalter, (.) 
       if you turn this thing there this switch 
14 INS %ein%mal, 
        once 
   ins %hand turns to the right%... 
15 INS %zweimal.% 
        twice  
   ins %hand turns to the right% 
                                                        
8 Embodied actions are transcribed following Mondada (2018): 
%    %   Descriptions of embodied actions are delimited between two identical symbols and synchronized with 
   corresponding stretches of talk/silences. 
..... Preparation of an action 
,,,,, Retraction of an action 
ins Participant who performs the embodied action  
16 STU (0.2)% okay. 
             Okay 
   Ins  ,,,,% 
 
The instructor begins the topical sequence by asking the student to turn the headlight switch 
to the next position (01–02). The definition of the expression to be introduced, Abblendlicht 
(‘low beam light’), is anchored by ostension. The instructor highlights the definiendum as a 
new and important term by segmenting it into its constituent syllables: ab (.) blend (.) lischt 
(03). The student receipts it with an acknowledgement token ʔhmhm (04). The instructor then 
contrasts the newly introduced term Abblendlicht with a similar sounding expression: 
Abendlicht (‘evening light’, 05–08), which is attributed to anonymous third parties (viele sagen, 
‘many say’) as an incorrect understanding of Abblendlicht. Although the word-play has a 
humorous quality, which the student appreciates by laughing (06), the main objective of the 
contrast is to negate a possible misconception of when the low beam is to be used, namely 
(only) in the evening. This becomes clear through the antithetic replacement of the NDC (07) 
with the following list enumerating situations in which the low beam should be used (im 
dunkeln tunnel regen schneefall::: (.) dämmerung_, ‘in the dark tunnel rain snowfall dusk’, 10). 
Interestingly, this list does not include Abend (‘evening’), although it would have been correct 
as well. 
The definition in extract 8 consists of three components: the definiendum is ostensively 
introduced by the handling of the switch, which brings about the object of the definition (01–02, 
and again in the closure of the explanation in 13–15); the NDC rejects a common 
misconception of the term’s meaning (05–08), which therefore the student could have also 
entertained, and the PDC corresponds to the classical definitional strategy of providing the 
genus proximum (‘the light which you have to use’) and the differentiae specificae (the 
situations in which the definiendum has to be used, 09–11). The instructor designs her 
definition pedagogically in several ways: by letting the student turn the switch into the relevant 
position, prosodically highlighting the expression to be defined, monitoring the student’s 
understanding displays, and gesturally enacting actions, as well as  through repetition (cf. 
Svennevig, 2018). 
 
7.4 NDCs building on contextual salience 
NDCs can be derived from salient features of the context qualifying as possibly relevant for 
the expression to be defined. These can be visually available properties of the spatial 
surroundings or praxeological features of actions that are still ongoing or have been 
performed in the recent past. In other words, the negation can concern all sorts of possible 
meanings, which can be taken to share common ground, without necessarily being mentioned.  
In extract 9, the salient common ground is provided by the joint project of redecorating 
a room and the objects involved in this action. Pauline (PAU) and Tamara (TAM) are painting 
a wall with wall-paint. During this activity, the younger sister Tamara asks her older sister 
Pauline if one can also paint doors (01).  
Extract 9: FOLK_E_00217_SE_01_T_02_DF01_c1372-1380 gestrichene Türen 
01 TAM ka_ma eigentlich auch (.) türen streichen, 
       can you actually also paint doors 
02 PAU ((schmatzt)) .hh ka_ma, 
      ((lipsmack))     you can but actually 
03     aber eigentlich also es kommt drauf an was man für türn hat, 
       well it depends on the kind of doors 
04     gibt auch (.) Dgestrichene türn.D 
       there are also painted doors 
05     Ndie sin aber halt dann net mit mit wandfarbe.N 
       but they are PTCL not with with wall paint  
06     sondern Pdie sin lackiert in der regel.P 
       they are lacquered usually 
07 TAM (0.3) ach so,   
             I see 
08 PAU (0.5) aber des is auch gestrichen, 
             but this is also painted 
09     (1.0) halt mit lack gestrichen. 
       PTCL painted with lacquer 
Pauline confirms that doors can be painted. She hastens to add an explanation, which 
amounts to a definition of the phrase gestrichene türen (‘painted doors’, 04). She first negates 
a possible understanding of this phrase, which is contextually salient because of the ongoing 
practical action, and which could therefore have been a presupposition of Tamara’s question: 
that ‘painted’ means ‘painted with wall-paint’ (05). The definition is produced as an account for 
why a straightforward answer to the question is not possible, because it modifies the terms of 
the question. The PDC provides an alternative, which is paradigmatically related to the 
negated possible meaning component, namely, lackiert (‘lacquered’, 06).9 Tamara responds 
with the change-of-state token ach so (‘I see’; Golato and Betz, 2008), thereby showing that 
she did not expect doors to be lacquered. This seems to support Pauline’s assumption about 
her sister’s understanding, namely that she expected painted doors to be painted with wall-
paint. It thus confirms the usefulness of Pauline’s expansion of her answer by way of her 
definition of ‘painted doors’. In 08–09, Pauline repeats the contrastive semantic aspect. After 
the extract, Pauline continues to talk about her experiences with painted doors. 
The definition responds to an information-seeking question and is produced by the 
participant with the higher epistemic status. It is the older sister Pauline who is guiding 
Tamara throughout the joint redecoration project, instructing, controlling, and correcting the 
actions of her younger sister. The NDC anticipates a misunderstanding of the expression 
‘painted doors’ and more generally of the action of painting doors, which is probable because 
of the contextual salience of using wall-paint. The definition thus does corrective work, not as 
in section 7.2 concerning an overt claim of the addressee, but rather concerning a 
presupposition Pauline can be seen to have made in her talk. 
In the last excerpt of this article, taken from a dinner conversation among students in 
Milan, three friends are sitting at a kitchen table, while a fourth person (the host) is preparing 
dinner, standing next to them. Giulio (GIU) has just started telling the others that he will go on 
vacation with a bunch of friends on a sailing boat. He explains why they decided to take a 
boat. 
 
Extract 10 Mi13CE1-37, 03:31-03:58 vacanza itinerante 
01 GIU andiamo in barca^a vela, (.) si chiama brontolo,  
       we’re going by sailing boat (.) it’s called grumpy 
02     (0.7) 
03 GIU la barca, 
       the boat 
04     (0.7) 
05 GIU >non abbiam deciso noi^il nome.<  
        we haven’t decided ourselves^the name. 
                                                        
9 Of course, the past participle lackiert is not a paradigmatic alternative to the prepositional phrase mit wandfarbe 
in terms of parts of speech, but only in terms of its semantics. 
06     .h perché po- no- fondamentalmente cos’era v- la cosa 
          because        fundamentally    what was   the thing 
07     noi cercavamo (.) un::a Dvacanza itineranteD no? 
       we were looking for (.) itinerant holidays right 
08     (0.3) 
09 GIU cioè che Nnon non:: non stare in un postoN Pvolevamo spostarci.P (.) 
       that is that not not not staying in one place we wanted to move around 
10     solo che (.) il camper costa una cifra.= 
       it’s just that (.) the caravan costs a lot of money 
11 ELE =hm 
12     (1.4) 
13 GIU interrail costa una cifra e non è molto comodo e^è uno sbatto 
       interrail costs a lot of money and is not very comfortable and it is 
14   da organizzare^e nessuno ha molto tempo per fare le cose.  
   stressful to organize and no one has a lot of time to do the things 
At a certain point of his narrative, Giulio utters the common Italian expression vacanza 
itinerante (translated as ‘itinerant holidays’, 10). This expression is preceded by a pause and 
a lengthening of the [n]-sound in the indefinite article un::a, which exhibits a production-
problem.10 Subsequently, Giulio provides a definition of vacanza itinerante: he first negates a 
possible understanding (non stare in un posto, ‘not staying in one place’) and then provides 
the intended meaning (volevamo spostarci, ‘we wanted to move around’, 09). We observe a 
change in perspective between the NDC and the PDC, in this case from impersonal (non 
stare, ‘not staying’) to personal (volevamo, ‘we wanted’), where ‘we’ refers to the group of 
friends with whom Giulio is planning to take the trip, and is followed by a verb of volition. He 
thus presents ‘itinerant holidays’ as trips in which a group of friends moves from one place to 
the next—rather than as a vacation in which they would be based in one place and take short 
trips from there. Hence, what Giulio actually defines is the way in which a vacanza itinerante 
differs from the generic understanding of ‘holidays’, i.e. its differentia specifica. He does so in 
a way that gives recipients the opportunity to respond, by using the token no? (‘right’) just 
after mentioning what will end up being the definiendum (07). This opportunity is not taken 
(08) and Giulio extends his turn with cioè (‘that is’, 09), which projects an explanation that will 
eventually be recognizable as definitional. Here, the NDC and the PDC are introduced as a 
parenthetical explanation, after which Giulio resumes his narrative (10). 
 
8. Discussion 
In this article, we have analyzed a definitional practice that we have found to be used across 
four Germanic and Romance languages. The pervasiveness of definitions in which a 
definiendum is first followed by an NDC and subsequently by a PDC is noticeable.11 The 
analysis has shown that such definitions emerge progressively in a context-sensitive way. As 
their turn-at-talk unfolds, speakers can treat any expression—a technical term, a colloquial 
word, a phrase, etc.—as warranting definition. The NDC is pivotal for the online-production of 
the definition. It retrospectively allows addressees to identify the object of the definition (the 
definiendum), and it projects that the speaker is going to produce a PDC. The NDC is 
essential because speakers use it to display that they are making an assumption about their 
                                                        
10 We argue that the lengthening of [n] displays the speaker’s hesitation in choosing between the male (“un”) and 
the female (“una”) definite article. 
11 Among the languages studied, only German has developed a specific antithetic conjunction that speakers use when introducing the 
affirmed definitional component, i.e. the conjunction sondern (see ex. 3, 4, 8, 9), whereas they do not use the contrastive conjunction aber 
(‘but’). In the Italian excerpts (ex. 7, 10) no conjunction is used, whereas in the Dutch excerpt the speaker articulates the negation token nee 
(‘no’) before producing the affirmed definitional component. The French excerpt exhibits the contrastive conjunction mais (‘but’, ex. 5). 
addressee’s putative understanding of their talk, while at the same time impeding such an 
understanding. As we have shown, such assumptions may be grounded in common 
knowledge about what an expression ‘usually’ or ‘expectably’ means (ex. 5, 7, 9, 10), or 
grounded in unequal epistemic stances endorsed by the participants (ex. 3, 4, 8). It is 
precisely the epistemic status that may be evoked in order to disagree with a proposed 
definition, especially in argumentative settings (ex. 6, 7). Since the definitions analyzed in this 
article are both recipient-designed and interactionally situated, they are not stipulative and 
often do not purport to give a context-free meaning of the expression in question. NDCs 
sometimes do not deny the truth value of a possible meaning: for instance, by saying that 
‘children’ are children ‘not because a man goes to bed with a woman’ (ex. 7), Galimberti 
negates the relevance of this specific understanding for his argumentative purposes—rather 
than negating the fact that children can be conceived in that way. Negation, in this context, is 
thus not a logical operation. It recalls the Platonian position that negation does not establish 
the conceptual contrary but a diversity (Plato, Sophist 257b). By negating what is putatively 
true, relevant, etc. for other parties, speakers promote an understanding that serves their own 
purposes.  
Definitions are indexical, fragmentary, and produced for all practical purposes: on the 
one hand, they necessarily rely on implicit shared knowledge, on the other hand, they are 
aspectual: they promote one specific understanding, which is relevant for the interaction at 
hand. In accordance with this observation, we have shown that speakers accomplish three 
different, yet, on occasion, overlapping actions, by using the definitional format discussed 
here: a) they may define an expression for argumentative purposes—both in ordinary 
interaction among friends (ex. 5) and in politically oriented debates (ex. 6, 7); b) they may 
impart knowledge to an addressee who displays and/or is treated as being less 
knowledgeable on a topic—hence its presence in expert interviews (ex. 3) and in oral 
university examinations (ex. 4); and c) they may deal with a possibly emerging problem of 
understanding—as we have documented on the basis of two excerpts taken from ordinary 
interaction among friends (ex. 9, 10). On occasion, these dimensions are overlapping, as in 
ex. 8, where the driving instructor imparts knowledge to the student while at the same time 
securing the their correct understanding of the newly introduced term. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that defining-in-interaction is a highly contingent, situated, and recipient-
oriented practice. Speakers define expressions in order to manage assumed or exhibited 
asymmetries in knowledge, to solve problems of understanding and to support argumentative 
positions. Definitions often do more than just clarify (intended) meanings. They are 
argumentative means used to persuade the recipients to adopt the speaker’s worldview and 
position on a matter. This is particularly the case if definienda are disputed in the interaction 
itself or in larger societal discourses. We have based our evidence on a format, observed in 
four different languages, with which speakers first introduce an expression, then add an NDC, 
which projects a PDC. Unquestionably, speakers also produce definitions using other formats, 
which we have not discussed in this contribution. Whereas the format analyzed here has 
proved to be related to specific communicative purposes, it may very well be that other 
formats of definitions are used for implementing other kinds of actions. Moreover, speakers of 
other (not Indo-European) languages may use distinct formats. Further investigation is 
needed to identify and describe both language-specific resources for definition, as well as 
cross-linguistically observable practices. 
This also holds true for the study of negation—a research area which has only scarcely 
been addressed in research on social interaction. Supporting findings from prior studies on 
negation (e.g. Deppermann, 2014; Ford, 2001, 2002; Schegloff, 1992), our analysis suggests 
that recipient-design is one of the prime motivations of using negation in talk. Negation 
appears to be a vital resource for securing understanding, because it allows speakers to take 
into account the attested or putative understandings, assumptions, expectations, etc. of 
addressees that could lead to obstacles in the accomplishment of intersubjectivity. By 
immediately displaying the possibility of unintended meanings and by discarding them at the 
same time, negation allows speakers to locate the meaning of their turns at talk in a matrix of 
possible meanings. Studying in which ways other uses of negation are recipient-designed in 
indexing speakers’ assumptions about their interlocutors appears to be a promising line of 
future research. 
Both definition and negation are key phenomena of the constitution and negotiation of 
meaning in talk. Hence, this article contributes to research in Interactional Linguistics and in 
Conversation Analysis by promoting the study of what has been termed Interactional 
Semantics (Deppermann, 2011, 2018; Greco and Traverso, 2016)—a notion that sparks both 
fascination and trepidation among ethnomethodologically oriented researchers, epitomized in 
Maynard (2011:199) labeling it a “provocative topic.” However, in studying definitions in 
interactional contexts, we have shown that the ‘problem of meaning’—which has been 
addressed by many anthropologists, philosophers, sociologists, and linguists, among others—
is sometimes also a practical problem for the interactants. Implementing the format discussed 
in this article is just one way in which interactants, on a very local level, work towards solving 
that problem in a situated, contingent, and recipient-oriented way. 
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